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This paper examines the central place of the list and the
associated concept of an identifier within the scaffolding
of contemporary institutional order. These terms are
deliberately chosen to make strange and help unpack
the constitutive capacity of information systems and
information technology within and between contempo-
rary organizations. We draw upon the substantial body
of work by John Searle to help understand the place of
lists and identifiers in the constitution of institutional
order. To enable us to ground our discussion of the
potentiality and problematic associated with lists we
describe a number of significant instances of list-
making, situated particularly around the use of identifi-
ers to refer to people, places, and products. The
theorization developed allows us to better explain not
only the significance imbued within lists and identifiers
but the key part they play in form-ing the institutional
order. We also hint at the role such symbolic artifacts
play within breakdowns in institutional order.
Introduction
A data structure is a term that is used broadly to refer to
some systematic format for organizing data (Tsitchizris &
Lochovsky, 1982). This concept is clearly central to the
interests of the information disciplines (information science,
information management, information systems, computer
science). Much of the infrastructure of information and
communication technology, for instance, is clearly taken up
with the mechanics of data structures, particularly as it per-
tains to applications within business and government.
However, although much research and development con-
tinues to be devoted to finding better ways of storing, retriev-
ing, and manipulating data structures, this concept is only
rarely examined critically within the information disci-
plines. By this we mean that the data structure is treated
largely as a technological artifact, helping to support, but
somewhat isolated from, considerations of institutional
order. As such, data structures appear to form part of the
accepted and unexplored background to the conduct of
investigation and explanation in these disciplines.
In previous work we adopted the technique of sense-
breaking to help reveal some of this accepted and unex-
plored background (Beynon-Davies, 2013). Sensebreaking
is a standard anthropological technique which is particularly
useful for thinking about the accepted or conventional in
different ways. Hence, we particularly wish to decouple the
concept of data structure from that of digital computing and
communications technology in the current paper. To do this
we consider two apparently mundane and related symbolic
artifacts that are used by pretty much everybody and as such
form part of the conventional background of contemporary
life. The first is that of the list and the second is that of the
identifier. We shall show how these interrelated artifacts are
critical to form-ing the contemporary institutional order.
The hyphen is deliberate in the term form-ing. This is
because we want to argue that both the list and the identifier
are important examples of the way in which actors create
form from substance with the intended purpose of
in-forming themselves and others. We therefore utilize the
terms form, form-ing, and in-forming in a specific sense,
which will become clear in the body of the paper.
To help in the development of theory about the place of
the list and identifier in the formation of institutional order,
we draw substantially upon three theoretical traditions,
which we shall demonstrate are related in the body of the
paper.
We base the development of theory about the data struc-
ture mainly in the work of Austin (1962) and the early work
of Searle (1970), which is generally denoted with the term
speech act theory. Speech act theory has been much applied
in the information disciplines, for many years. This domain
of application is typically encapsulated in the term the
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language/action tradition (Weigand, 2006). We also draw
upon the more recent work of Searle, and particularly his
development of what he refers to as social ontology (Searle,
1995, 2010). For Searle the social world is constituted from
the physical world using three key building blocks, which he
refers to as status functions, constitutive rules, and institu-
tional facts.
But there is another tradition which we shall draw upon
in our account of the workings of lists and identifiers. This
goes under various names such as information modeling,
data modeling (Simsion &Witt, 2005), conceptual modeling
(Chen, 1976), or even perhaps enterprise modeling (Dietz,
2006). Within these traditions the data structure as represen-
tational form is typically portrayed as a “mirror” of institu-
tional reality (Agre, 1997). We shall break with this framing
of the data structure by particularly using certain modeling
constructs from this tradition, such as attribution, associa-
tion, and classification, to help explain how institutional
facts are constituted through lists of identifiers.
The main body of the paper is taken up with considering
what Searle’s social ontology offers to the framing of both
data structures and the relationship of such artifacts to insti-
tutional order. The work of Searle never directly engages the
notion of a data structure itself. Hence, the second main
contribution of the current paper is to develop a perspective
on the data structure that is consistent with Searle’s
theorization.
This leads to another contribution, which is to demon-
strate how data structures scaffold the constitution of insti-
tutional order. Bowker and Leigh Star (1999) and Iannacci
(2010) made a convincing case for the place of classification
schemes and data standards as critical elements of what they
refer to as the information infrastructure of institutions.
However, their theorization does not attempt to explain the
“mechanics” of how the data structures reliant on such clas-
sification and standardization support and frame institu-
tional action. A scaffold is a structure used in the
construction industry to support the building or repair of
physical structures. To use a term originally developed in the
work of Gibson (1977) and later modified in the work of
Norman (1999), the scaffold affords the act of construction
or repair. We fundamentally want to argue that lists and
identifiers act as crucial internal scaffolding in the continual
reconstruction of contemporary institutional order. Such
symbolic artifacts serve to represent and communicate
aspects of the institutional order. But they also afford people
access to numerous systems of action that make up institu-
tional order.
Therefore, to decompose our overall aim into a series of
objectives, we want to do three main things with this paper:
• To develop a theorization of the data structure through a
consideration of the list and identifier. To do this we intend to
draw upon work within speech act theory, the language/action
tradition, and conceptual modeling.
• To show through further theorization how these apparently
mundane and “insignificant” artifacts are critical to helping
form institutional order. To do this we draw upon the building
blocks of Searle’s social ontology—status functions, consti-
tutive rules, and institutional facts.
• To utilize the metaphor of scaffolding to show how lists and
identifiers afford institutional action. To help ground this we
consider identifiers of people, places, and products and show
how lists of such terms act as scaffolding not only for intra-
institutional action but also for inter-institutional action. We
also hint at the ways in which such scaffolding by its very
nature is prone to break down.
Because we utilize so much of the work of John Searle it
seems right to try to emulate not only his “method” but also
some of his style of exposition in this paper. Searle, in most
of his work, clearly adopts the method of analytical philoso-
phy (Dummett, 1993). This broadly is that philosophical
tradition characterized by its emphasis on clarity of argu-
ment. Such argument is frequently conducted in relation to
an analysis of language as well as a general respect for the
background of knowledge established in the natural sci-
ences. One common approach to doing analysis in this
approach to philosophy involves isolating or working back
to something considered fundamental but which is taken as
given. Explanation then takes place in a process of recon-
struction or synthesis from first principles, by means of
which something can then be demonstrated.
Argument in this tradition is also typically presented in
what might be called a “tutorial” style of writing. The aims
of many analytic philosophers adopting this style appear to
be two-fold. They want to be as clear as possible to as wide
a readership as possible. This fits neatly with our aims in this
paper. We want to be as clear as we can about why we think
data structures should matter more significantly to disci-
plines such as information science, information systems, and
information management. But we also want to reach as
much of a potential readership in these communities as we
can with this style of exposition.
An Infinity of Lists
Goody (1977) provides a review of a number of uses
made of lists by ancient cultures. He sees the list as a
particularly important artifact because of its central role in
the “domestication of the savage mind.” This refers to the
transition between ways of thinking characteristic of primi-
tive societies to those ways of thinking characteristic of
societies in the modern age. In a similar vein, Eco (2009)
believes that societies make lists as part of their attempt to
impose order or control on the world. He argues as such, that
society is reflected in an infinity of lists. This idea has some
pedigree. Schmandt-Besserat (1978) proposed that clay
tokens dating back to 8,000 B.C. are some of the earliest
examples of lists of commodities used among the first city-
states. Ezzamel (2009) has argued that the construction and
dissemination of lists were performative rituals critical to the
maintenance of the ideological order of ancient Egypt.
Urton (2003) has argued for the place of assemblages of
knotted strings, known as khipu, as unique artifacts for the
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making of lists among the Inka. Rosenberg and Grafton
(2010) consider the history of the timeline, a particularly
interesting type of list.
More recently, Lyon (1994) pointed to the dangers of
what he refers to as social sorting—the way in which con-
temporary institutions make life-critical decisions about
individuals on the basis of inclusion or exclusion of personal
identifiers on particular lists. He argues that such lists are
explicitly devices which serve to sort those persons regarded
as “eligible members” of a particular institutional area and
to exclude others, regarded as in some way “undesirable”
(Lyon, 2004). Gawande (2010) takes a more positive
outlook on the list, arguing for the importance of check-lists
as key aids in the control or coordination of behavior in
critical areas of contemporary life such as engineering and
surgery.
In this paper we want to argue that lists not only have
history, they make history. Lists are also debated and dis-
cussed not only in the academic media but also in the enter-
tainment media. For instance, there are a number of
infamous lists described in Black’s (2002) study of the
malignant institutional order which constituted the “Holo-
caust.” He particularly focuses on the way in which this
order relied on the various ways in which the Nazis used
electronic tabulators to produce and manipulate lists of
persons to be transported to the death camps. In another list
made famous by the film directed by Steven Spielberg, nine
important lists were used to assign Jews from the Warsaw
ghetto to work in the factories of Oskar Schindler (Keneally,
1982). These lists enabled a small and select group to escape
the death camps.
In a recent book, Usher (2014, p. xv) cogently and elo-
quently lists some of the key functions that lists play in
human society. Many of these functions of lists will be
considered in this paper.
“1. Life is chaotic—often unbearably so. The ability to
divide some of that chaos into lists, to make the
onslaught manageable, can bring much-needed relief.
2. Human beings are fearful of the unknown and as such
have a real need to label and group things, to assign
them to comfortable lists.
3. Lists can make us more productive and eradicate pro-
crastination. Nothing on earth, resignation aside, cuts
through the thick fog of a daunting workload as effec-
tively as a to-do list.
4. Everyone is a critic. Ranking things—best to worst,
biggest to smallest, fastest to slowest—can be strangely
addictive, no doubt because it makes us feel
knowledgeable.
5. Time is precious. Distilling huge swathes of monotonous
information into easily digestible lists ensures that we
have more time to enjoy ourselves and make lists.”
Lists and Identifiers Matter
In undertaking our analysis we therefore start with that
which we shall consider fundamental but which is normally
taken as given: that of a list of identifiers as a data structure.
We then attempt, using speech act theory and the theory of
social ontology as key anchors, to reconstruct the relation-
ship between data structures and institutional order by
examining the critical role that both lists and identifiers play
in constituting institutional action. By means of this synthe-
sis from first principles we hope to demonstrate how this
reframing of the data structure has a number of important
consequences for the way in which we approach data struc-
tures in the information disciplines.
We started the paper by defining a data structure as a
particular way of organizing data. In this sense, a data struc-
ture is clearly an abstraction—a set of principles for both
storing and accessing data. In certain literature (Guttag,
1977) this abstraction is sometimes referred to as an abstract
data type. But data structures such as lists are clearly
instantiated—given form. In this sense, a specific instance of
a list, such as a product list, passenger list, or picking list is
also a data structure (Kent, 2012). In the concrete, a data
structure is used to represent things and through such rep-
resentation to help constitute institutional order. In the dis-
cussion that follows we shall utilize the term data structure
both to refer to an abstraction and to an instantiation, and we
shall try to be clear in the body of the argument when the
particular sense of the term applies.
At its most basic, a list corresponds to a set of elements:
an assembly of distinct “things,” considered as a thing in its
own right. Most lists used for modern institutional purposes
are actually built upon the abstract data type of the ordered
set known as a sequence or a tuple, implying that both the
elements of the list and the position of the elements in a list
are significant—hence, the tuple <1,2,3,4 > is different from
the tuple <2,4,3,1 > .
Treated purely as artifact, a data structure can be consid-
ered a set of data elements, which in turn consist of a set of
data items (Tsitchizris & Lochovsky, 1982). In the discus-
sion that follows we shall treat the list as a data structure
consisting of a set of list-items. Each of these elements will
take a similar form that we shall model upon a binary rela-
tion (Frost, 1982). A binary relation can be considered a
triple of data items, in which the first data item is termed the
subject, the second the relation, and the third an object.
Subjects, relations, and objects are unrestricted in the origi-
nal theory of binary relations (Frost, 1983). However, to start
from first principles we shall use an even simpler represen-
tation in which the subject and object of such relations will
be restricted to the use of identifiers, and the relation itself
will be specified as an infix predicate.
Binary relations are useful because it can be shown that
many other forms of data structure can be constructed from
these simple, atomic forms (Frost, 1983). For instance, a
related set of binary relations can be used to form a tuple.
Tuples are an inherent and important construct in Codd’s
(1970) theory of a relational database. A relation in a rela-
tional database is formed from a set of tuples. This particular
data structure, of course, underlies the data management
systems used in mainstream digital computing systems.
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But there is another reason we choose to focus on the list
and identifier. We deliberately utilize the idea of the list and
the associated construct of an identifier to help ground the
notion of a data structure because, as is evident from the
previous section, such artifacts are ubiquitous and as such
are typically treated as mundane and accepted. Within the
current paper we use these artifacts as sensebreaking
devices—to attempt to break through entrenched and limit-
ing conceptions embedded in the worldview of the informa-
tion disciplines. We shall also deliberately use the term list
rather than file, table (relation), or record, because the term
list has some useful connotations in everyday English usage.
People inherently connote the creation of lists with doing
things. They create shopping lists, picking lists, to-do lists,
admissions lists, and check-lists. But we would argue that
files, tables, and records as other forms of data structure are
constitutive of and help constitute institutional order, in
much the same way as described for the list and the identifier
in this paper.
So lists for us are sets of binary relations. Also, binary
relations, at least in the context of our paper, consist of a
coupling of identifiers. This suggests the first question: What
is an identifier?
In his early publications, Searle (1970), drawing upon the
work of Austin (1962), argues that the terms making up the
message in some act of communication fulfil one of two
functions—they refer to or they predicate things. The refer-
ring function enables actors to identify a thing while the
predicating function serves to describe a thing. We use the
term thing here in an entirely neutral way to stand for any-
thing that can be referred to or predicated. It may be a
physical thing such a person or place or product. It may also
be something which has a purely institutional status such as
a contract or a sale or a payment.
Referring is a critical function that allows the sender of
some message to specify one and only one thing to which an
utterance applies, while also providing the means for a
receiver to identify the thing from the utterance. Within his
theory of speech acts, Searle maintains that language is used
to refer in two major ways: either through use of an identifier
or through some definite description. Identifiers are particu-
larly useful in the context of patterns of communicative
action because they can refer to some instance of a thing
without actually the need to describe it. They can also refer
to this instance across many different communicative situa-
tions. For instance, personal names such “Joe Bloggs” are
typical identifiers, while a definite description of this person
might consist of the phrase “the man with red hair and a
pronounced limp.”
Why Lists and Identifiers Matter
We can demonstrate how identifiers and lists matter to
individuals and organizations in contemporary institutional
order using two related contemporary examples.
Traditionally a journal article is identified by a composite
of its attributes such as journal name, author(s), date of
publication, article title, volume number, issue number, and
page numbers. This particular combination of data items is
often cumbersome to use in searches for articles and is
frequently error-prone, typically because of incorrect repre-
sentation of such details in references. This particular
approach to identification of articles is also becoming obso-
lete, as many online-only journals have moved away from
the practice of publishing in delineated volumes and issues.
For such reasons, an approach to uniquely identifying
publications or their parts through a digital object identifier
(DOI) has been developed internationally. A DOI is a char-
acter string used to uniquely identify a digital object, such as
an electronic document. The DOI system is implemented
through a federation of registration agencies coordinated by
the International DOI Foundation. Organizations such as
journal publishers pay to become registrants in the DOI
system, which enables them to assign DOIs for their elec-
tronic documents (DOI, 2014).
A DOI is divided into a prefix and a suffix, separated by
a slash. The prefix identifies the registrant of the identifier,
while the suffix is chosen by the registrant to uniquely iden-
tify a specific digital object. For example, in the DOI
10.1000/182, the prefix is 10.1000 and the suffix is 182. In
terms of the prefix, 10 refers to the particular DOI registry,
while 1000 identifies the particular registrant; in this case the
International DOI Foundation itself. The suffix 182 identi-
fies a single digital object—the latest version of the DOI
Handbook (DOI, 2014).
One key advantage of a DOI is that it can be used to
identify a complete journal, an individual article in the
journal, or a single figure in the particular article. Another
key advantage is that in the DOI system a clear separation is
made between an identifier for a particular object and its
so-called metadata, such as the location where the object can
be accessed. This means that while the DOI for a document
remains “persistent” for its lifetime, its metadata, such as its
location, may change a number of times. DOIs plus their
associated metadata are deposited by a registrant in the
international DOI registry. The metadata, such as the docu-
ment’s location, are updated whenever this changes.
Now consider lists and why they matter. In business
schools in the UK academics are encouraged by their deans
to treat one particular list with respect. This is the Associa-
tion of Business Schools (ABS) list of journals and their
rankings. This particular list has driven the activity of aca-
demics in business schools in the UK for over 5 years.
To understand why lists matter so much, here we need to
describe something of the context of this institutional order.
Each year funding bodies in the UK allocate around 7.6
billion pounds sterling of research funding to higher educa-
tion institutions. As major input into decisions as to where to
best allocate such funding, the British government, through
its funding agencies, has required all UK higher education
institutions to engage in a regular audit of the quality of their
research. This audit (known in the past as the Research
Assessment Exercise or RAE) has been conducted in
approximately a 4- to 5-year cycle, starting in 1986 (1986,
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1992, 1996, 2001, 2007) (Barker, 2007). The latest audit
(now known as the Research Evaluation Framework or REF)
was conducted in 2013.
To help manage the process, a number of performance
indicators are requested in each submission and form the
basis on which the quality of research is assessed by panels.
The key such performance indicator is a listing of the four
best-quality publications for each academic submitted by a
university under a particular unit of assessment. As such,
this publication list of DOIs in association with a list of
rankings of business journals becomes a key facet serving to
define a “research active” member of some university
department.
In the past, many panel members claim that they assess
the quality of a particular submission by either reading each
and every paper submitted or reading a majority sample
from those submitted (Cooper & Otley, 1998). Many others
believe that panel members either formally or informally use
lists of journal rankings to establish a convenient proxy for
the “quality” of journal papers. Within the Business and
Management unit of assessment, for instance, there is much
discussion of the use of one particular rankings list: that
published on a regular basis by the ABS.
Therefore, the outcomes of lists and list-making often
have important consequences for both institutions and insti-
tutional actors. For instance, REF panel members make
decisions as to ranking of particular university departments
in the UK and, as a consequence, implicitly rank the quality
of research of individual academics. On the basis of a list of
the rankings assigned to university departments, the UK
government, through its funding agencies, decides how
much to award each university in terms of research funding.
For low-rated departments this means that they will receive
no monies for research and will have to rely on money
provided for teaching. For high-rated departments, monies
can contribute many tens of thousands of pounds sterling per
research-active academic. The proportion of money
assigned for both teaching and research to universities is a
key determinant of the amount of infrastructure support
provided to academics for the conduct of research. For
instance, higher-rated university departments are generally
more able to provide lower teaching quotas to staff and to
support activities such as conference attendance.
Lists, Identifiers, and Status Functions
Lists and identifiers clearly matter both to individuals
(such as academics) and to institutions (such as UK univer-
sities). The very presence of such artifacts directs the actions
of numerous different actors acting within the space or
frame of numerous different institutions. But how do these
artifacts work? How is it possible to theorize about the
significance of lists and identifiers to institutional action?
We start by establishing that lists and identifiers are both
examples of what Searle calls a status function. Searle
believes that status functions can be represented as consti-
tutive rules of the form:
X counts as Y in C
where X is some thing that counts as some other thing (Y) in
some context (C).
The term constitutive in the term constitutive rule is used
in that sense adopted in the work of Giddens (1984). His
constitutive cycle was introduced as a means of addressing
the intellectual division between an action perspective on the
nature of institutions and a structural perspective on the
nature of institutions (Walsham & Han, 1991). Giddens
believes that these two perspectives on institution can be
brought together through the idea of structuration. On the
one hand, the structure of social institutions is created by
human action. Through human interaction, the social struc-
ture of institutions is reproduced but may also change. On
the other hand, humans utilize institutional structure as a
resource in interpreting their own and other people’s action.
This means that institutions act as a constraint on human
action. This cyclical process of structuration is the process
through which the patterned order we consider as institution
is constituted and reconstituted.
Take the idea of a DOI as an example of an identifier,
which in turn is an example of a status function. As a
constitutive rule the relationship between a DOI and the
document it identifies might be expressed as:
X (a DOI) counts as Y (a specific journal article) in C (the
registrants and users of the international DOI registry)
It is also possible to consider lists as status functions in their
own right. In other words, the act of creating a list typically
involves naming the list. The naming of the list acts as a
form of proxy for the common context declared on the
members of the list. For example, we might name a list
important to the institution of the business and management
panel of REF as the list of journals in the Information
Management subject area of the ABS. We might further
express the members of this list of significance to this insti-
tution and its communicants in the following manner:
Journal of the American Society for Information Science and
Technology (JASIST) MEMBER OF <List of journals in the
Information Management subject area of the ABS>
Annual review of information science and technology
MEMBER OF <List of journals in the information management
subject area of the ABS>
. . .
Within this set of binary relations the subject of each relation
consists of an identifier, while the object of each relation
consists of the list. The relation MEMBER OF consists of a
membership predicate that serves to form a list of identifiers.
But inclusion in a list also implies an order or ranking in the
list. Hence, each subject area in the overall ABS 2010 list is
ordered in terms of the “star” rating associated with journals
(from 4 indicating the highest ranked through to 1, the
lowest ranked).
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This means that particular institutional actors in the UK
academy used the formation of the ABS list 2010 to consti-
tute or “declare” the notion of the overall “quality” of a
particular journal. The ranking or ordering of a particular
journal in the ABS 2010 list served to “direct” the formation
of further lists by other institutional actors such as the list of
publications submitted for the Information Management
area by university X to REF 2014. By implication, the
assignment of a particular DOI to this latter list served to
declare or constitute the “quality” of the article referred to.
By further implication, the inclusion of four DOIs in this list
also served to constitute the declared “quality” of particular
academics working in UK higher education bodies.
The Notion of “Speech” Acts
The major claim of speech act theory is that much com-
munication of interest to institutions is accomplished
through what Searle, following Austin, refers to as speech
acts. Within the last paragraph of the previous section
various lists operate as speech acts. According to Searle,
individual speech acts such as this can be viewed from at
least three different viewpoints: as a locutionary act, an
illocutionary act, or as a perlocutionary act.
A locutionary act defines the content of a speech act and
is divided further into an utterance act and a propositional
act. An utterance act corresponds to the act of physically
creating some form from a particular substance. In contrast,
a propositional act consists of the act of using such a form to
refer to or predicate some things. For instance, we may
speak the words “JASIST is a 3-ranked journal on the ABS
2010 list.” As an utterance, this would be considered purely
in terms of a number of forms—phonemes formed in the
substance of air. As a proposition, such forms would be
treated as a series of terms that identify or predicate some
things of interest. Hence, JASIST is a term (an identifier) we
use to refer to a particular journal.
But speech acts not only have content they have intent.
Locutionary acts, as we have seen, can be decomposed as
propositional acts and utterance acts. But speech acts are
also illocutionary acts. Each speech act not only expresses
the proposition being communicated, it also expresses the
attitude or “force” of that being communicated. This is
because illocutionary acts are focused on getting the receiver
of the message to do something, to take further action.
Indeed, we typically recognize that the intent of some com-
munication has been achieved by observing the actions of
the receiver and seeing whether certain conditions set by the
attitude, force, or intent of the communication are satisfied.
The result here is what is meant by a perlocutionary act.
Searle (1970, 1975) maintains that it is possible to for-
mulate five key types of communicative act in terms of
differences in the intentions that the actor communicating
has, and which he labels with the terms assertives, direc-
tives, commissives, expressives, and declaratives. These
types of communicative act can be distinguished in terms of
illocutionary force or propositional attitude (the kind of
attitude a speaker has when she/he says something) and the
direction of fit between the world and the propositional
content of the communicative act (the word).
For example, in terms of illocutionary force, assertives
are communicative acts that explain how things are in the
world, such as in, “Our orders have fallen by 10% this
month.” In contrast, directives are communicative acts that
represent the senders’ attempt to get a receiver to perform an
action, such as—“Please ensure that our production target
is met next quarter.” Declaratives are communicative acts
that aim to change the world through the communication
itself, such as “This order has been fulfilled.”
The term direction of fit was used by Austin (1962) to
refer originally to the relationship between mental states
(perhaps rather confusingly called the word) and reality (or
what philosophers refer to as the world). In the work of
Searle and others the word is expanded to denote the notion
of an “utterance” discussed earlier. Three directions of fit are
proposed between an utterance (word) and the world: word-
to-world (intended to describe the world), world-to-word
(intended to change the world), and null (making some
utterance implies that some fitting to the world has already
taken place). Each type of illocutionary act, as we shall see
in the next section, has a different direction of fit.
The Performativity of Lists
The language-action tradition, approach, viewpoint, or
perspective has been around for over 30 years, if we take the
publication of a paper by Flores and Ludlow (1980) as its
starting point. Generally, the term is used to refer to the
adoption or translation of a series of ideas from the philoso-
phy of language, particularly the work ofAustin, some of the
early work of Searle, and possibly some of the work of
Habermas, into the information disciplines (Goldkuhl &
Lyytinen, 1982; Lyytinen, 1985; Lyytinen & Hirscheim,
1988; Te’eni, 2006; Weigand, 2003; Winograd & Flores,
1986).
The language/action tradition is so called because of its
focus on communicative action and the use of such commu-
nicative action by actors to do things. It takes something of
an intellectual leap in treating a data structure, such as a
list-item, as an act of communication—as a speech act.
More precisely, the data structure itself corresponds to an
utterance act (Searle, 1970). However, each utterance in a
list also corresponds to a propositional act because the status
functions comprising the utterance are used to refer to things
or to describe things.
But lists, as we have seen, are not only locutionary acts,
they are also illocutionary acts—they not only communicate
content, they communicate intent. Take an example modi-
fied from that given by Searle (1983). Assume that a retail
manager gives her procurement operative a list of products
needed to replenish a particular store. Further assume that
these products are referred to by the identifiers P1, P2, P3.
. . . (Searle, 1983). Hence, we might represent this list as
follows:
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P1 MEMBER OF <Procurement list for store 1>
P2 MEMBER OF <Procurement list for store 1>
. . .
Now for the procurement operative each item in her list is an
illocutionary act. It directs her to purchase the item referred
to by the identifier. The entire list also acts as a directive to
the operative. It probably establishes the action-context for
the list—to procure items for store 1.
Now consider the same list used by another actor.
Assume that the retail manager also employs an external
consultant to audit procurement. He is therefore given
access to the same procurement list as the procurement
operative. The consequence of this is that the audit consul-
tant uses the same procurement list in a different way from
the procurement operative. He probably interprets each list-
item not as a directive but as an assertive.
We can understand these differences more clearly by
considering the direction of fit of these two lists. The pro-
curement operative takes the list to the market and makes
purchases to match items on the list. Hence, the list func-
tions as an order or desire and has a world-to-word (list)
direction of fit. It is the responsibility of the procurement
operative to make the world, in terms of his purchases,
match the items on the list (the word).
Suppose the man’s activity is tracked by the audit con-
sultant. The consultant writes down everything the operative
orders. When both the consultant and the procurement
operative return to report to the manager, they have identical
lists. However, the function or direction of fit of the two lists
is different. In contrast to the operative’s world-to-word
direction of fit, the consultant’s list has a word-to-world
direction of fit.
The differences between these two functions become
apparent when we examine what happens when an error is
made—when a breakdown occurs in the use of lists.
Suppose the operative fails to procure product P1, but
instead procures a different product with the identifier P1.1.
In terms of the consultant’s list the error is easily corrected.
He crosses out the identifier P1 and substitutes the identifier
P1.1. However, in the case of the procurement operative the
situation is not so easily corrected. Correcting his list does
not change the state of the world.
To reiterate, the consultant’s list comprises a set of
assertives, which have a word-to-world direction of fit. It is
the function of the consultant’s list to match reality—it
functions as a list of assertions of what happened. In con-
trast, the procurement operative’s list comprises a set of
directives, which have a world-to-word direction of fit. It is
the responsibility of the procurement operative to make the
world match the items on the list (the word).
The Materiality of Lists
Within this example of procurement as an institutional
process we have a clear linkage between a list of identifiers,
its use for communication, and the instrumental actions
effected by such communication. But there is a mysterious
thing going on here. In a classic speech situation the retail
manager would be issuing a series of spoken instructions to
the procurement operative—“buy P1, buy P2, . . .” But in
the example described the list is actually communicating.
The logical consequence of this is that it makes sense to
think of lists of identifiers as engaging in limited action—as
displaying what Cooren (2004) calls “textual agency.”
Data structures such as lists not only matter as institu-
tional actors, they are clearly built from matter. The typical
material of speech act theory by implication is the act of
speaking. The majority of the examples cited in the work
of Austin (1962) and Searle (1970) relate to actions in
which one actor utters a spoken sentence and one or more
actors interpret and respond to this verbal message. Speech
acts are also typically analyzed as isolated utterances
between two actors, although there is typically a back-
ground assumption that a particular speech act is likely to
be part of a larger conversation or dialog (Searle, 1991).
There are some isolated references in the extant literature
associated with Searle to the idea of treating data struc-
tures such as records as speech acts—but these are only
mentioned in passing and never elaborated upon in any
detail.
This means that the language/action tradition makes a
leap in treating data structures as speech acts. But in doing
so, most of this literature tends to adhere to the assumption
that the only thing that changes between a spoken sentence
and a data structure is the mode and material of delivery (the
utterance) (Goldkuhl & Lyytinen, 1982). All other things
remain the same, in terms of the nature of a speech act.
In this section we want to challenge the validity of such a
background assumption. We want to argue that data struc-
tures not only differ from the spoken word in terms of
delivery mode—there are a number of specific characteris-
tics of data structures which might explain their special
status in the constitution of institutional order. There are not
only a set of subtle differences between what an utterance
act means in relation to data structures as compared to
speech, there are consequential implications for ideas of
agency associated with data structures that relate to the
particular materiality of such form.
First, there is the fairly obvious point that, whereas it
makes sense to talk of a speaker and hearer or more broadly
a sender and receiver in terms of acts of speech, it makes
more sense to refer to the writer and reader of a data
structure or more broadly perhaps a creator and user. Both
an act of speech and an act of creating a data structure
are likely to be embodied acts (Mingers, 2001), meaning
that an actor uses one or more parts of his effector apparatus
in making the spoken sentence or the data structure. In the
case of the spoken sentence the actor primarily uses his
larynx to manipulate sound. In the case of the data structure,
however, the actor creates or forms an artifact from some
persistent material, typically using further artifacts, such as
a digital computer, in the production of the data structure
itself.
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Second, this difference in labeling of actors is related to
a difference in the material from which data structures are
formed, as compared to the material of speech. Speech is
clearly composed of sound waves which degrade in air. This
means that the life of an act of speech is a short one and
inherently bound to a specific performance of situated action
between two or more actors—all of whom are co-present. A
data structure in comparison is typically designed to persist
beyond the act of creating this artifact. This inherently
means that a data structure, as an instance of written com-
munication, has a “life” over and above the actors who
produce and consume it (Derrida, 1971).
Third, in the case of an act of speech it makes sense only
to think of one actor sending or “creating” a series of sound
waves and another actor (or a limited number of co-present
actors) receiving or “reading” such vibrations in air. In the
case of the life of a data structure it is likewise initially
created once by a certain actor. The artifact should also be
deliberately disposed of or deleted once by one actor. In this
sense, there must be a deliberate act of “forgetting” as well
as “remembering” in the case of data structures. But within
its intervening “life” the data structure may be read and
possibly updated a number of times and these acts may be
undertaken by a multitude of different actors. In this sense,
any one data structure in terms of its life-history is perhaps
better considered an institutional “conversation” or “dialog”
between some defined collection of actors.
Fourth, the whole point of creating data structures is to
enable communication across time and space between mul-
tiple actors. The elements of a list, for instance, as “utter-
ance” persist beyond their act of production (Derrida, 1971).
The very persistence of the list-item enables it to fulfil a
purpose subtly different from speech: that of referring to or
predicating things across time and space to multiple actors.
This means that the creator of a data structure is likely to be
remote from the consumer of this data structure—where the
term remote implies some temporal distance as well as prob-
ably some spatial distance. The communication is also likely
to travel between one actor and many other remote actors, in
such senses.
Fifth, the properties of a data structure listed earlier lead
us to break with the framing of the data structure employed
in much of the language/action viewpoint—that only
humans act in relation to data structures. In other words,
humans have agency but data structures do not. Following
Cooren (2004) and others (Agerfalk, 2004; Ashcraft, Kuhn,
& Cooren, 2009), we feel it important to think through some
of the consequences of applying speech act theory to the
idea of data structures—namely, to think of data structures
as having agency.
Agency is typically defined as the ability to perform
actions that have outcomes (Rose, Jones, & Truex, 2005).
Agency is a characteristic of agents and an agent is seen as
any-thing that can produce an effect or a change. Clearly
much action within contemporary institutions is not enacted
by humans but by machines, particularly by information
technology (IT) systems. This means that the concept of
agency is particularly problematic for any discipline that
attempts to deal with the relationship between technology
and institution. In social determinist accounts only humans
have agency. In technological determinist accounts technol-
ogy has agency in the sense that technology influences insti-
tutional activity.
Cooren (2004) and others attempt to develop a middle
ground where technology, such as data structures, not just
serve to influence but serve to constitute institutional activ-
ity. He makes the key argument that “texts” such as reports,
contracts, memos, or work orders can be said to be perform-
ing action that have outcomes in the sense of producing
effects upon the actions of other actors. In short, texts on
their own appear to make a difference to institutions and as
such should be considered as having a limited form of
agency. To demonstrate this he provides a number of thought
experiments. For instance, imagine a visual sign placed in
the reception area of an organization building. This sign acts
in the sense of directing people to do certain things such as
swiping their entry pass at the entry gate or visiting recep-
tion to authorize their entry. As such, the sign stands in place
of particular actions typically undertaken by security per-
sonnel responsible for controlling organizational entry. The
sign acts to instruct people without the need for security
personnel to reiterate the same thing time and again in acts
of verbal communication.
The key argument we make here is that we should adopt
the stance of considering artifacts such as data structures as
displaying the potential to take limited action in the produc-
tion and reproduction of institutions. In doing so it becomes
possible to consider lists of identifiers as particularly potent
actors in the constitution of institutional order. List-items
serve to stand in place of the assertions, commitments, direc-
tions, or declarations of particular human actors in multiple
situations where such actors are not co-present. This idea is
indicative of “the communication as constitutive of organi-
zation” viewpoint—the idea that “communication gener-
ates, not merely expresses, key organizational realities”
(Ashcraft et al., 2009, p. 3).
Institutional Facts and Social Ontology
To help understand the place of the list and the identifier
in the formation of institutional order we need to unpack two
further concepts from Searle’s theoretical edifice. We need
to explain how constitutive rules produce institutional
facts and how such institutional facts help constitute social
ontology (institutional reality).
For Searle, institutional facts are the very “stuff” of social
reality and he contrasts such facts with what he calls brute
facts. Brute facts are matters of brute physics, chemistry, and
biology, and as such, these facts exist independently of
human institutions. An example of a brute fact is that the sun
is 93 million miles from the earth. In contrast, institutional
facts are matters of culture and convention. They exist only
within the context of human institutions, such as JASIST is
considered a 3-star journal on the ABS list 2010.
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Institutional facts rely on the background of collective
intentionality (“aboutness”). In Making the Social World
Searle (2010) adds a further claim: that status functions are
created through declarative speech acts. This results from
that peculiar property of such declarations, which we have
already seen—that they have both a world-to-word and
word-to-world direction of fit. Collective intentionality is
thus built from mutual acceptance or recognition of status
functions by a group of actors. We, as actors, make some-
thing the case by declaration that a given status function X
exists.
So the social world relies upon collective acceptance of
status functions. But such acceptance by its very nature is
not permanent, it is temporary. It relies upon the continual
accomplishment by institutional actors of collective inten-
tionality. This is why in the next section we use the metaphor
of scaffolding the institutional order. Lists and identifiers are
important elements in the institutional order, but they always
contain in their application the potential for the breakdown
of such order.
We use the term breakdown here in the sense adopted in
the philosophy of Heidegger and utilized by some propo-
nents of the language/action tradition (Winograd, 2006).
Such proponents adapt this concept from Heidegger’s insis-
tence that things and their properties are not inherent in the
world but arise only in an event of breaking down, a process
in which human actors undergo an experiential shift in
which things change from being ready-at-hand to being
present-at-hand. The classic example of the hammer and the
nail is typically used to explain this experiential shift. To a
person hammering in a nail the hammer as such ceases to be
foregrounded in perceptual terms. In Garfinkel’s (1967)
terms it is seen-but-unnoticed; part of the background
readiness-to-hand that is taken for granted. The hammer
presents itself as a hammer only when there is some kind of
breaking down, such as when it breaks, slips from the ham-
merer’s grasp, or bends the nail. In a similar manner a data
structure, such as a list or list-item, is normally ready-to-
hand. Only when there is some breakdown, such as when the
identifier fails to identify something or a list-item identifies
or classifies the wrong thing in institutional terms, do we
experience it as being present-at-hand.
The primary difference between a brute fact and institu-
tional fact relies on the different status that such facts have in
relation to some theory of existence—some ontology. Brute
facts are observer-independent. Within a brute fact the status
of the thing referred to has an existence independent of
institutions. Indeed, brute facts are independent even of the
institution of language. In contrast, institutional facts are
observer-relative. Within an institutional fact the status of
the thing depends on a collective attitude or acceptance by
the actors concerned that the thing has a certain function.
This actually defines the notion of a status function for
Searle.
One might be tempted to use this polar distinction
to make the claim that institutions deal solely with institu-
tional facts. Institutions, such as manufacturing companies,
healthcare organizations, or higher education institutions,
clearly have to deal with both brute facts and institutional
facts. Indeed, many things can be referred to and described
not only by brute facts but also by institutional facts. Searle
has even acknowledged that, whereas brute facts are inde-
pendent of language, we need language to represent such
facts (Searle, 2006, 2007).
Consider a thing familiar in the institutional context of
manufacturing—that of a stillage. Stillages are physical
things and as such have an existence independent of the
institution. In other words, they can be described in terms of
brute facts such as—a stillage is a steel box being approxi-
mately 1 meter in depth, height, and width. These brute facts
can be confirmed by any observer of such objects.
But what is the function of a stillage? A stillage may be a
physical structure but these physical structures are assigned
a particular status in the institution concerned. A stillage
is used to store various stages of finished product—
“stock”—in the context of the manufacturing plant. We
might even frame the constitutive rule in this case as being:
A stillage (X) actually counts as a unit of stock (Y) in the
manufacturing plant (C)
In the same way, treated purely as a material artifact, as a
form, a data structure can be considered a brute fact, or more
accurately a series of brute facts. In other words, as a
sequence of perhaps written letters or numbers a particular
identifier is observer-independent. But this term can also be
treated as both an informative and a performative artifact. As
such, this term acts in the capacity of what Searle calls a
status indicator. This is because “we impose intentionality on
entities that are not intrinsically intentional. A status indi-
cator is a representational device that allows an entity to
represent something beyond its physical features” (Searle,
2006, p. 21). Hence, a passport number, postcode, or a
commodity code, as we shall show, are all brute facts that act
in the capacity of status indicators to institutional facts.
The Scaffolding of Lists
Scaffolding has been applied particularly as a metaphor
in areas such as learning theory, child development, and
distributed cognition. In such areas scaffolding is a term
used to refer to augmentations that allow humans to achieve
goals that would normally be beyond us. The scaffold helps
structure human action by supporting and guiding it. But
such scaffolding also serves to discipline or guide such
action. This idea appears to have a certain synergy with
Giddens’s constitutive cycle discussed earlier.
We have argued in the current paper that lists and iden-
tifiers are critical scaffolding in the institutional order. In this
section we examine this notion of scaffolding more closely
to learn what it tells us about the nature of institutional lists
and identifiers.
Orlikowski (2006, p. 461) describes certain characteris-
tics of physical scaffolding that provide insight into the way
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in which what she refers to as “everyday knowing in prac-
tice” is constituted. It is useful to reflect on some of these
characteristics and apply them to understanding the case of
the list and identifier as material scaffolding for institutional
order. According to Orlikowski, scaffolds are temporary,
flexible, portable, dangerous, generative, and constitutive.
Scaffolds are temporary structures designed to support
particular aspects of construction. Once this aspect of con-
struction is regarded as complete they are dismantled. Scaf-
folds are flexible in the sense they are erected in many
different situations but adapted to the particular exigencies
of the situation. Scaffolds are portable. They can be quickly
and easily assembled and disassembled across many differ-
ent sites. Scaffolds are dangerous. Because they are tempo-
rary, flexible, and portable they are vulnerable to breakdown
and failure. Scaffolds are generative in the sense that they
augment the process of physical construction. Finally, scaf-
folds are constitutive in the sense that they play an important
part in affording the very act of construction.
Although we tend to regard our lists of identifiers as
permanent, they are in fact temporary structures, with a
lifespan typically determined by the duration of the institu-
tional order they scaffold. The very value of lists lies in their
flexibility. As symbolic artifacts the general principles of
listing and identifying are applicable and adaptable to many
different situations. They are particularly portable structures
in the sense that we can expand and contract lists to account
for many different institutional situations. They are danger-
ous in the sense that our infrastructure of lists and identifiers
contain within them the potential for breakdown. But they
are necessary because they are generative of institutional
facts. And such institutional facts are constitutive of the
institutional order itself.
However, we should be careful not to take the metaphor
of scaffolding too far in relation to data structures. Unlike
physical scaffolding, which tends to afford the acts of con-
struction or repair, the scaffolding of data structures is a
crucial part of the action of institutions. Lists of identifiers
are necessary to institutions because they are constitutive of
the institutional order itself. Hence, the scaffolding of lists is
not something external to the idea of institution, it is critical
to the institutionalizing process itself.
Lists of identifiers are normally ready-to-hand for insti-
tutional actors and are initially created typically to scaffold
some delimited domain of routine institutional action on the
part of such actors. However, over time such scaffolding is
often extended to supporting other aspects of institutional
action not framed by the initial contextualization of such
lists. This sometimes assumes the status of interinstitutional
scaffolding and in such situations the scaffolding of lists is
particularly prone to breakdown.
To help ground the theorization established we consider
in the next three sections a number of contemporary
examples of lists of identifiers that are crucial to form-ing
order in and between a number of institutional domains. We
begin with personal identifiers that scaffold the developing
area of digital identity management. We then consider the
related identifiers of place and identifiers of products. These
three particular types of lists of identifier are critical scaf-
folding for contemporary interinstitutional orders underly-
ing electronic commerce and electronic government.
Identifiers of People, Place, and Product
To demonstrate how personal identifiers work in scaf-
folding institutional order, consider one particularly signifi-
cant example of a personal identifier—the passport number.
Each country in the world is able to create its own form for
such an identifier. In the UK a passport number currently
consists of nine digits. So key facts important to the institu-
tion of governance in the UK are established in the form:
[ < Passport no. > REFERS TO <Person>]
For instance:
[109999555 REFERS TO Joe Bloggs]
Note, we cannot actually represent or record as a fact the
relationship between a physical thing and an identifier
directly. We have to use other terms as proxies. The fact we
have just listed above actually relates two identifiers. One is
a “natural” identifier and consists of a personal name; one is
a “surrogate” identifier, created by a particular institution (in
this case the UK Passport Office on behalf of HM Govern-
ment) to uniquely refer to a particular person. Both natural
and surrogate identifiers can refer to some thing, but surro-
gate identifiers are used by institutions to attempt to enforce
the uniqueness of reference across contexts or situations
important to the institution concerned. Hence, the surrogate
identifier 109999555 will always refer to one and only one
British citizen or citizen of the British Overseas Territories.
In contrast, while the natural identifier Joe Bloggs is suffi-
cient to refer to this person in many contexts, in certain
situations the referring function will break down, because
there are likely to be more than one person named Joe
Bloggs in the UK.
Now consider lists and why they matter to the institution
of governance—particularly lists of identifiers. Suppose we
build a list of the following form:
[109999555 REFERS TO Joe Bloggs]
[105599544 REFERS TO Anwar Prakash]
[103399565 REFERS TO Zu Cheng]
. . .
This list can be used in a number of different ways by
different institutional actors across different government
agencies. For instance, a member of the UK Passports Office
can use this list to declare British Citizens. In doing so, such
actors are inherently using the identifiers in this list to
instantiate a class, in the following manner:
[109999555 ISA British citizen]
[105599544 ISA Citizen of the British Overseas Territories]
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[103399565 ISA British citizen]
. . .
The relation ISA in these list-items serves to classify a
particular identified person as a British citizen or as a citizen
of one of the British Overseas territories. Passports and
passport identifiers were originally designed to enable the
declaration of citizenship in the activity system of interna-
tional travel. But such tokens and identifiers are now used in
many other situations relating not only to government and its
agencies but to interaction with private sector institutions.
For instance, amember of theUKBordersAgency can use
a list-item from the list given earlier to authenticate a person.
In other words, an institutional fact from this list asserts that
the individual is who they say they are. But passports and
passport numbers are used as a formof personal identification
in many other settings. For instance, many financial institu-
tions demand the strong authentication provided by a pass-
port when opening a bank or building society account in the
UK. Passports are also frequently used by young people to
prove their age in situations such as the purchase of alcohol.
The usefulness of this token and associated identifier is
particularly evident in that some 71% of the UK resident
population hold a passport, according to the 2011 census.
Passport numbers are, of course, not the only identifiers
important to the scaffolding of governance. Other personal
identifiers are used in other institutional settings and provide
access to the activity systems of these institutions for indi-
viduals. For example, the NHSNo (National Health Service
number) is used in the institutional context of the National
Health Service, while a national insurance number (NINo) is
used in the institutional context associated with legal
employment by UK institutions.
Identifiers, as we have seen, do not describe. For this,
constitutive rules need to work in a process which Searle
refers to as the iterative or recursive application of constitu-
tive rules (Searle, 2000). This is the process by which one
status function counts as another status function, which in
turn counts as another status function, and so on . . . In other
words:
A counts as B; B counts as C; C counts as D . . .
The process of iterative recursion of constitutive rules is
particularly evident in the way in which actors use status
functions to abstract. The idea of classification or instantia-
tion (ISA), which we have already discussed, is a key
example of abstraction. As we have seen, as a constitutive
rule, classification can be expressed as:
X ISA Y in C
The relation ISA (Brachman, 1983) here may be taken as a
special type of counts as relation, in the sense that one status
function X is taken as representative of a more encompassing
status functionY.Within this rule X is normally a placeholder
for some identifier, whileY is a class or category to which the
thing identified by X applies. C denotes the institutional
context in which this particular classification rule holds.
Constitutive rules are important because they serve to
generate institutional facts. Hence, an example of an insti-
tutional fact generated by the instantiation rule would be:
[109999555 ISA British citizen in the context of international
travel]
Institutional facts such as this not only serve to identify these
particular things to the institution concerned, they bring
these things into existence for the institution. Hence, such
facts serve to help define the so-called ontology of the
institution—its notion of what reality is. Institutional facts
such as what counts as a British citizen clearly do not work
in isolation. They typically work within lists. The very act of
creating or making an item within a list brings these things
into existence, through a process of declaration.
A passport as an identity token does not just, of course,
contain details of the passport identifier which refers to a
particular person. The passport number as the main identifier
is not the only status function used on a passport. Hence,
when a particular passport is issued it serves to declare a
whole series of institutional facts about the person, such as:
[109999555 GIVEN NAME Joe]
[109999555 SURNAME Bloggs]
[109999555 DATE OF BIRTH 15/03/1957]
[109999555 SEX male]
[109999555 NATIONALITY British]
The relations between status functions here are all matters of
attribution or designation. In other words, they all describe
or attribute particular values to a particular person. Hence,
through a process of recursion of status functions we start to
form a necessary scaffold for that part of the institutional
reality which is defined by the context in which these facts
are utilized—whether this is in international travel or finan-
cial transactions or acts of leisure.
We can demonstrate the importance of lists of personal
identifiers to scaffolding both the intra- and interinstitutional
order by considering what we have termed in previous work
the personal identity web (Beynon-Davies, 2006, 2007).
Individuals in the information society utilize a complex web
of personal identification for existence and action. In our
information society an individual may take on a number of
different identities—one for each electronic service in the
public, private, and voluntary sectors with which the indi-
vidual engages.
As a consequence, an individual may accumulate a vast
array of personal identifiers for such “services” and is also
likely to accrue a range of physical representations or tokens
of such multiple identification: credit card, debit card,
driving licence, passport, library card, parking permit, etc.
This means that organizations spend considerable effort in
collecting, storing, and maintaining lists of personal identi-
fiers of various forms. The public sector, in particular,
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typically experiences key difficulty in tracking the institu-
tional facts of personal identification across multiple agen-
cies. In the UK, for example, a report from the Office of
National Statistics (ONS, 2005) estimated that in 2005 there
were approximately 300 million personal contact detail
records held in the UK public sector—each with their own
personal identifier. This constitutes almost five such institu-
tional facts for every UK citizen, and excludes, of course, all
the array of other institutional facts making up the personal
identity web.
Therefore, the central place of the list in forming con-
temporary institutional order can be demonstrated in terms
of the problematic of personal identity management, some-
times referred to as digital identity management (Neubauer
& Heurix, 2010). Expressed purely as a technological issue,
this can be seen to involve the use of various technologies to
manage identifiers associated with persons in their use of IT
systems. It should be apparent from the previous discussion
that we wish to broaden this conception. For us, digital
identity management resolves around the use of lists of
personal identifiers used as collective declarations of signifi-
cance. This particularly helps explain how and why the
management of personal identity through such lists is such a
problematic area for modern individuals, organizations, and
societies (Whitley, Gal, & Kjaergaard, 2014).
Personal identity management is a term used to conflate
three critical and entangled processes of signification:
authentication, identification, and enrolment. Authentication
involves answering the question—Am I who I claim to be?
Authentication is typically signaled by lists of personal iden-
tifiers: utilized and possibly stored in some institutional
system of data structures. Personal identifiers, as we have
seen, are status functions used to reference an individual
actor. Identification in the large involves answering the
question—Who am I?—and is typically signaled to institu-
tions by attributes or properties stored about the individual,
including a recorded history of events in which the indi-
vidual has participated. Enrolment involves answering the
question—What can I or should I do?—and involves con-
stituting the range of expectations used as both a resource
and a constraint by actors in a particular institutional domain
of action.
Take the issue of identity fraud, which usually results
from identity theft. Identity fraud occurs when someone
uses personal data gained about another person (particularly
personal identifiers such as usernames and passwords on an
access control list) to “impersonate” that person. In such
situations the identifiers serve to institutionally count as the
person in situations of remote action. Identity theft occurs
when an unauthorized person uses another person’s identity
to make purchases or engage in other illegal activity (Jones
& Levi, 2000).What is interesting is that the focus on digital
identity management and its related issues is a compara-
tively recent phenomenon. Poster (2006), for instance, finds
no reference to the notion of identity theft before 1995.
Indeed, the US government only made identity theft a crime
in 2003.
This suggests that both identity fraud and identity theft
only became significant in the context where various remote
but communicating actors rely on lists of identifiers for the
constitution of their collective intentionality. The rising
amount of identity fraud and the identity theft upon which it
is based is actually the fraudulent use of identity only in the
sense that much of our institutional sense of who people are
and what they are entitled or expected to do—both institu-
tional facts—is represented in a multitude of lists shared
across multiple actors working in many different institu-
tional realities. This constitutes the contemporary problem-
atic of digital identity.
Identifiers of Place
Another critical element of the scaffolding of much insti-
tutional order is the identification of place.Aparticular place
is normally referred to through the identifier of some
address, Hence:
[ < Address> REFERS TO <Place>]
Addresses, as we shall see, scaffold institutional action in a
number of ways. Within the urban landscape of much of the
world, identifiers of place are typically formed as compound
status functions. By this we mean that they are formed as a
compound of a number of significant elements, typically
organized in some hierarchical manner. Hence, addresses
are often formed from house numbers, street names, town
names, or city names and possibly even country names. For
instance:
[ < 12, Friars Road, Dagenham, England, United Kingdom>
REFERS TO <Place>]
To help manage identifiers in the institutional order of place,
many countries have introduced a much more succinct form
of surrogate identifier, critical to scaffolding a number of
contemporary institutional contexts. The postcode in the
UK, the zip code in the US, and the Postleitzahl in Germany
all have different forms and work in slightly different ways.
In this section we shall therefore focus on the British post-
code.
In the UK a postcode is an alphanumeric identifier
between five and eight characters long. It consists of two
parts divided by a space. The outward code consists of a
postcode area and postcode district. The inward code con-
sists of the postcode sector and postcode unit. In contrast, in
the US a zip code consists of a sectional center facility code
(SCF code) followed by a postal-zone number followed by a
hyphen followed by an add-on code.
Postcodes are not simple identifiers. This is because what
they refer to in relation to place varies. Within the UK, for
instance, each postcode unit can identify a street, part of a
street, a single address, a group of properties, a single prop-
erty, a subsection of some property, an individual organiza-
tion, or a subsection of some organization. What is
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appropriate in each case is often based on the amount of
mail received by the postcode unit. Hence, the following
identifier,
[PO16 7GZ REFERS TO <A particular set of residences in
Fareham>]
Whereas, the following identifier,
[CF99 1NA REFERS TO <The National assembly of Wales>]
As revealed in their name, postcodes were originally
designed as supporting scaffolding for the delivery of letter
and parcel mail. They were particularly designed to expedite
the delivery of mail by improving the mail sorting process.
But breakdowns still occur in this institutional setting. Mail
still gets delivered to the wrong address. Part of the reason
for such breakdown revolves around the granularity of the
postcode. In other words, a postcode frequently identifies an
area of residences rather than a particular residence. This is
part of the reason that Ireland, which never introduced post-
codes, is now introducing a more sophisticated form of
identification based on a seven-digit code that will uniquely
identify each of its 2.2 million residential addresses
(Economist, 2014b).
The list of postcodes in current use in the UK is main-
tained in something known as the Postcode Address File.
This list establishes not only the form of identifiers but also
the boundaries of each postcode unit. This list currently
serves to enable the identification of approximately 29
million delivery points. But this list is not a fixed structure.
To cope with the continually changing nature of the built
landscape in the UK this list is continuously maintained and
periodically updated.
But postcodes help scaffold various other types of con-
temporary institutional action beyond the mere sorting and
delivery of mail. Many commercial and public satellite navi-
gation systems allow the user to navigate to an address by
street number and postcode. This may be life-critical in
cases in which an emergency response ambulance needs
to arrive within minutes at a particular incident location.
Life insurance companies and pension funds frequently
use postcode areas to assess the longevity of customer seg-
ments and determine appropriate pricing for premiums and
contributions. Car insurance companies frequently use post-
code area as a convenient proxy for the risk of events such as
theft or accident. Primary healthcare units and secondary
schools use postcodes to define the catchment area for their
services.
Because of its ubiquity as an identifier of place, post-
codes in many institutional areas have become indicators of
social status. The perceived linkage between house pricing
and postcode area means that residents sometimes campaign
to the Royal Mail to change their postcode to that of an
adjoining area. Conversely, the catchment area of some
desired school, as formed in a list of postcodes, frequently
influences house pricing.
The addressing of place is thus not only important scaf-
folding for the constitution of intrainstitutional order, it is
critical for effective interinstitutional action. For this reason,
many countries have decided that the management of lists of
identifiers of place is too important to be left to individual
institutions. Denmark, for instance, has one central body
which publishes and updates addresses (Economist, 2014a).
In the UK, the official address register known as the
National Address Gazeteer is owned by a private company
established in a partnership between central and local
governments.
Identifiers of Products
Finally, we consider the identification of products. In
particular, we shall consider the mechanics of using bar-
codes as classifications of standardized commodity coding
and the use of such systems of classification in identifiers for
products.
Abarcode is a machine-readable representation of a code.
Traditionally, barcodes are one-dimensional representations
that serve to code data in terms of the widths of lines and
spaces between lines. Typically, such a code is used as an
identifier for many different things in many different insti-
tutional settings. Almost every food retail store, from the
largest to the smallest, now sells products that contain bar-
codes. Patients in hospitals are frequently tagged with
plastic bracelets containing barcodes. Books and other
forms of documents are now given barcodes for ease of
tracking. Airline luggage is frequently tracked across the
world using barcodes.
The relationship or mapping between a barcode as form
and what it refers to is frequently and perhaps confusingly
termed a symbology. The most commonly used form of
symbology is that to standard commodity coding. The Euro-
pean Article Number (EAN), now renamed as the Interna-
tional Article Number, is widely used in association with a
standard for barcoding. As a form it consists of 13 digits in
which the first 12 digits code the item and the last digit acts
as a check digit. The first three digits of an EAN identify the
member organization to which the product manufacturer
belongs. The next three to eight digits identify the manufac-
turer itself, whereas the last two to six digits identify the
product itself.
Strictly speaking, a barcode in the realm of commodity
coding typically does not identify, it classifies. In this
context, a barcode as an existential object classifies some
thing as a particular product class. But barcodes can be used
to represent not only commodity codes but also serial
numbers. In this extended form a barcode can actually both
refer to and classify some thing:
[12345–5901234123457 REFERS TO <A particular product>]
[5901234123457 ISA <product type>]
Food retail outlets in the European Union use identifiers
such as this in various aspects of performance: tracking
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goods from suppliers, controlling stock in warehouses, man-
aging food displayed in supermarkets, and associating par-
ticular products sold with sales made to customers. To
facilitate standardization of data and hence effective analysis
for management information, many forms of electronic pro-
curement will use standard commodity classification coding.
Such standard coding schemes may also enable faster
searching for a particular item among a range of possible
suppliers. Commodity coding involves the assignment of
standard codes to item records (at the part number level) and
to purchase orders (at the purchase order line item level). So
a simple coding scheme in association with their use as
identifiers is critical to a vast amount of organizational com-
munication, decision-making, and action in and between
contemporary institutions that engage in commerce.
Conclusion
We return to the three major objectives set for this paper
in its introduction.
As a first objective, we have attempted to develop a better
theorization of the data structure, drawing upon work in
speech act theory, the language/action tradition, and concep-
tual modeling.
In this paper we have attempted to focus an exercise in
sensebreaking by considering the ontological basis of data
structures through a close examination of two apparently
mundane but related symbolic artifacts—that of the list and
the identifier. Considered as a data structure, a list consists of
a set of list-items, each of which can be considered a binary
relation. We also restricted our consideration of binary
relations to those containing identifiers, predicated in some
way. Identifiers are terms that refer to some instance of a
thing across many different communicative situations.
Because of the function they serve, identifiers are particu-
larly important data items in larger data structures utilized
by all institutions.
Although not specifically proposed as such in speech act
theory, the language/action tradition considers data struc-
tures, data elements, or data items (such as lists, list-items,
and identifiers) as speech acts. This means that we can
analytically decompose any data structure into a locutionary,
illocutionary, and perlocutionary act. As a locutionary act,
for instance, a binary relation can be further considered as
both an utterance act and a propositional act. As an utterance
a data structure is some form created from some substance.
As a propositional act the data structure is considered as a
set of “forms” that refer to or predicate some things.
But data structures as speech acts are also illocutionary
acts. Each data structure not only expresses the proposition
being communicated, it also expresses the attitude, “force”
or intent of that being communicated. This is because illo-
cutionary acts are focused on getting the receiver of the
message contained in a data structure to take further action.
We recognize that the intent of the data structure as com-
munication has been achieved by observing its perlocution-
ary effect. In other words, data structures are not only
forms, they serve to in-form, which in turn cause people to
per-form.
Gawande (2010), for instance, argues for the central
place of the check-list in improving systems of healthcare. A
check-list, like the procurement list we mentioned in the
body of the paper, can be treated merely as a set of descrip-
tions. Each description on Gawande’s check-lists has a spe-
cific intent—they direct multidisciplinary healthcare teams
to do certain things in specific sequences. The end result, if
such lists are successful, is that appropriate procedure is
followed in terms of medical intervention. Appropriate
medical procedure is likely to contribute, in turn, to success-
ful medical outcomes.
As a second objective, we have attempted to show how
data structures in their capacity as speech acts help form
institutional order. To do this we drew heavily upon the
building blocks of Searle’s social ontology—status func-
tions, constitutive rules, and institutional facts.
We have argued that making or form-ing a list-element
consisting of identifiers is a significant part of the way in
which modern institutional reality is constituted (Searle,
2010). Lists take a central place in the way in which orga-
nizations and society at large form order through the con-
struction of institutional facts that declare states of the world
(March & Allen, 2014). Such facts rely on a background of
collective intentionality and are used as a key resource in
communicating and reinforcing the nature of institutional
order through action.
Identifiers can only be used to refer to things. Such things
may be physical things or what Eriksson and Agerfalk
(2010) refer to as “institutional objects.” But through a
process of iterative or recursive application of constitutive
rules such status functions are typically used to connect to
other status functions that designate and prescribe.
Identifiers are particularly used to authenticate “things”
(people, places, commodities, etc.)—to declare their exis-
tence to institutions. But identifiers are not isolated artifacts.
We typically collect together such constructs in lists, and it
is the list which typically stands as a proxy for the institu-
tional context of the identifiers in the list. Thus, through this
process of membership, identifiers in lists form critical scaf-
folding for the identification of things. They serve to help
construct institutional facts which constitute the reality for
the institution concerned.
As a third objective, we utilized the metaphor of scaf-
folding to show how lists and identifiers afford institutional
action. Three domains of identification were used to ground
this analogical thinking.We considered identifiers of people,
places, and products and attempted to show how lists of such
terms act as scaffolding not only for intrainstitutional action
but also for interinstitutional action. We also hinted at the
ways in which such scaffolding by its very nature is prone,
on occasion, to break down.
Just like Bowker and Leigh Star (1999), the exercise we
have attempted here can be seen to employ a meta-level of
analysis above that of particular technologies; a way of
unpacking the enacted environment in which IT systems are
14 JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATION SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—•• 2015
DOI: 10.1002/asi
JOURNAL OF HE ASSOCIATION FOR INFORMATIO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY—November 2016
DOI: 10.1002/asi
2751
designed, constructed, and used. This enables us to under-
stand not only the ways in which order is constituted but also
the ways in which breakdowns (Bødker & Grønbœk, 1991)
can occur in contemporary institutional order. But the work
considered in this paper differs in a number of respects.
Bowker and Leigh Star, for instance, make a convincing case
for the place of classification schemes as critical elements of
institutional infrastructure. However, their theorization does
not attempt to explain the “mechanics” of how the data
structures reliant on such classification support and frame
institutional action. This has been the objective of the
current paper.
Clearly, digital computing and communications technol-
ogy has made the making of and use of lists much easier.
Larger lists can be built and such lists can be manipulated far
more quickly than in the past; such manipulation being
particularly reliant on the constructive importance of the
identifier. Hence, it is comparatively easy to search a list
containing millions of identifiers in many varied and
complex ways in a matter of a few seconds. The practical
ease with which modern list-making can occur, linked to the
increasing rationalization of action in modern life, has
meant that we rely on lists more than at any time in human
history. However, the increasing ease with which we can
create and manipulate lists frequently masks much of the
nature of lists as significant artifacts.
Lists of identifiers act not only as supporting “infrastruc-
ture” (Bowker & Leigh Star, 1999) or “scaffolding”
(Orlikowski, 2006) in particular organizations, but as insti-
tutional objects shared between organizations. The identifi-
ers of people, places, and products are particularly important
scaffolding not only for the actions of governance but also
for the actions of commerce. Such data are typically held in
registers of various forms—basic information systems
storing necessary identity data. Because of the criticality of
such data structures, many nation states have made efforts to
centralize registers of identification. In Finland, for instance,
four base identity registers are specified by central govern-
ment: a personal identity register, an enterprise identity reg-
ister, a building identity register, and a land identity register
(Rekisteripooli, 2003).
But lists of identifiers as institutional objects not only
serve to constitute institutional order but also are critical
elements in breakdowns in such order. For instance, lists of
personal identifiers act not only as critical scaffolding in the
inter- and intrainstitutional order, such lists help form a
considerable problematic for modern individuals, organiza-
tions, and societies (Whitley et al., 2014). Breakdowns in
institutional order are evident in the case of the Criminal
Records Bureau in the UK (Beynon-Davies, 2011), the own-
ership of automobiles in the European Union (Agerfalk &
Eriksson, 2011), and in the management of foreign students
in higher education in Sweden (Eriksson & Agerfalk, 2010).
Much has been written in communities of practice, par-
ticularly in the public sector, about both the potentialities
and pitfalls associated with the sharing of lists of personal
identifiers between institutional agencies. The framework
and approach described in this paper allows us to unpack not
only the key function that lists play but also some of the
inherent dangers that lie in any attempt at list-making. In
future work we particularly wish to use such sense-making
to demonstrate the importance of understanding not only
how intrainstitutional order is constituted but also how inter-
institutional order relies on the collective declaration of sig-
nificance through the scaffolding of data structures.
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